BY JULIO GODOY
The one thing the U.S. military claimed to have learnt from its debacle in Vietnam was that it was imperative to draft an "exit strategy" before starting a war. Though exit strategy was but a euphemism: When the body count swells, and the prospect of winning the war shrinks, it is time to get out of it without losing one's face.
In the 1980s, the exit strategy took several forms: On the one hand, the U.S. abolished the compulsory military service, and moved to an all voluntary army. That way, the middle class youth, the main actor of the peace movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s, could stay at home, and watch the wars to come on television. Its place was taken by what you may call the U.S. 'lumpen proletariat' -- the poverty-ridden black youth with no hopes in civil society, and later, the immigrant youth from Latin America. This way, if the body count was to be too high again, very few would care.
Who was the first U.S. soldier killed in Iraq in 2003? A Guatemalan-born, almost illiterate illegal immigrant orphan boy, who had seen in the U.S. military the easiest way to obtain the coveted green card.
On the other hand, the bulk of the exit strategy the U.S. military had called for three other varieties: First, to rescue the "splendid little war" of Teddy Roosevelt's times -- he was the guy who famously said: "Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far." Roosevelt used his big stick to battle a faint Spanish military and gain control over Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines in a swift war in the late 19th century. When Spain sued for peace, Roosevelt's secretary of state John Hay praised the "splendid little war". Splendid and little was it indeed. For the U.S. anyway: The enemy was weak, the war short, and the booty enormous.
In the 1980s, the U.S. government under Ronald Reagan spoke loudly again and carried a big military stick. But, for all the government's tough talks and investments in the army, the U.S. under Reagan did not go far: It took pride in invading such terrifying enemies as Grenada and bombing Libya's capital Tripoli.
The second strategy was to create or arm surrogate armies to fight the foes Washington wanted to eliminate: The Contras against the Sandinista revolutionary government in Nicaragua, Saddam Hussein's military to combat Iran, and the Afghan war lords against Russia. That was also a splendid idea: To pay corrupt, ruthless fools to fight your enemies. Whether the body count was high, or the war was lost, did not have to interest you: The cannon fodder was not yours. And strictly speaking, neither was the war.
The third strategy was the airborne attack without almost any use of infantry, to precisely avoid the body count. After having bombed Panama City -- another awesome enemy -- George Bush Sr. used the airborne attack to force Saddam out of Kuwait in the early 1990s. Later in the decade, William Clinton also used the no-infantry strategy in the "splendid little wars" of the Balkans, ostensible to bomb Belgrade.
But the strategy showed its limits when it came down to attack enemies hidden in places where there was nothing to bomb, as in Somalia. There, foot soldiers had to do the job -- but they faced an enemy that was even more ruthless than the hardest-nosed GI. When your boys kill enemies, no matter what means they use, you take pride of their success, and even might praise them as brave defenders of your values. But when it is the enemy who butchers your soldiers, you wonder about the wildness of war. In Somalia, Clinton did not care about an exit strategy or about losing his face -- it was worse to see bleeding GIs being dragged to death across the dirty roads of Mogadishu.
Along came George Bush Jr, the 2000, and the eternal "war on terror". Bush's advisors obviously believed the U.S. military was invincible and accordingly were not concerned about exit strategies or body count.
So they marched into Afghanistan and Iraq. Especially in Afghanistan, they ignored history and the local idiosyncrasy. If only they had read Winston Churchill's memories or Rudyard Kipling's war ballads -- or at least asked their new friends in Moscow about their recent war experiences in Hindu Kush -- they would have avoided rushing into a quagmire without a thought-out, face-saving exit. They would also have avoided talking about development, state building, and democracy.
Instead, they tried to bomb their way to controlling Kabul and surroundings. Other than killing thousands of civilians, they have had little success. Almost ten years later, the U.S. and its allies -- though they form "the most powerful military alliance of all times" -- are rushing for a way out of the Afghan imbroglio. That they might leave behind a corrupt-ruled, drugs-ridden, shattered country, controlled by the very same war lords they once despised is not important anymore. What counts now is not to be buried in the graveyard of empires. – GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES |
